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Introduction- The Act of Just Declaring Universal Rights (But 
Signing a Treaty) 
 
This thesis argues that our contemporary understanding of human rights 
grounded in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 
1948 (see Appendix 1 for the full text) and further developed in two international 
covenants (1966) carries within itself a series of problems that persist to this day. It 
claims these problems are rooted both in how the notion of the universality of 
human rights constrains the functioning of the polity, and in the conceptual error of 
proclaiming rights for every human being outside a political space. In support of this 
argument, I ground my critiques in the theoretical work of Carl Schmitt and Hannah 
Arendt respectively. The targets of my criticism are both the standard international 
legal interpretation of these rights as compiled in the General Comments1 to the 
treaties on human rights published by the United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR, 2008), and the direction in which they 
compel concrete decisions in extreme circumstances. I will use the practical example 
of the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe to exemplify the latter. 
The universality of human rights is not directly defined in the declaration –the 
notion being just declared– although its meaning and intent can be inferred from the 
usage of the pronouns “everyone” and “no one” at the beginning of all but two of its 
30 articles. They are meant to be held by every human being for the very fact of being 
a human being. The declaration does not enter into how to ascertain who is human 
or not, but the general consensus within the human rights community is well 
summed up by Jack Donnelly: “Human rights, following the manifest literal sense of 
the term, are ordinarily understood to be the rights that one has simply because one 
is human. As such, they are equal rights, because we either are or are not human 
beings, equally.” (Donnelly, 2007). Moreover, the declaration had a prescriptive 
intent when the preamble states: 
Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement 
for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, 
keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to 
promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and 
																																																																		
1 These General Comments published by the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights contain an ample body of comments declared by the same office to be “authoritative 
interpretations of the relevant treaty provisions” to each of the human rights treaties approved by the 
United Nations. 
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international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among 
the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their 
jurisdiction. (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948) 
The UDHR proclaims the existence of “rights” that it proceeds then to define, but 
not to justify2. These rights would be the foundation of later declarations and 
international agreements conforming a “core” of nine international human rights 
treaties3 between 1965 and 2006 (OHCHR, Core International Treaties, n.d.), –in 
particular, the two covenants of 19664– together with other treaties and international 
organizations and organs that would conform an international sphere of human 
rights law. Further international agreements would ground their legitimacy on this 
common core on human rights and have the United Nations, through its different 
agencies, as their “guardian5”, i.e. the 1951 Refugee Convention. Many of its 
principles were as well incorporated as fundamental rights in the constitutions of 
most democratic countries later on. 
This should not be confused with humanitarian law derived from the Hague 
(1899 and 1907) and Geneva (mostly four agreements in 1949 and a further one in 
1975) conventions that pertain to the sphere of the laws of war, and make no appeal 
nor claim to human rights nor any sort of universal inherent rights, being mere legal 
agreements between nations aimed at mitigating the damaging consequences of the 
scourge of war. Indeed their application is only possible in situations of international 
conflict, with a reduced set of rules for internal conflicts. They also stipulate the 
obligation of signatory states to persecute those who violate them. These conventions 
have been ratified by all states on the planet and are thus –and only because of this 
fact without any further claim to it– universally applicable (ICRC, Treaties, States 
parties, and Commentaries). 
What might seem like merely a technicality in the difference between human 
rights law and humanitarian law is actually part of the core of my critique to them. 
On one side, the universalist language of the declaration mimicked in subsequent 
treaties is unequivocal in stating the “equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
																																																																		
2 And neither do the international covenants. 
3 UN (2006). The core international human rights treaties. Geneva: United Nations. 
4 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
5 However, not as their guarantor, since “According to the legislation, States are expected to 
cooperate with us in ensuring that the rights of refugees are respected and protected.” 
irnatural 
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the human family”, implying all human beings; on the other, those very same treaties 
are nothing but agreements between countries bound exclusively to the signatories of 
those agreements. True enough, this language is limited to the preambles and lacks 
any normative value; and yet it states a clear claim to judge, censor, and orient the 
behavior of non-signatory parties to those treaties, to all humanity. Moreover, 
guidance on how to legally apply the human rights doctrine shows a clear design of 
making their universality a legal de facto reality6, possibly beyond the scope and 
reach of the treaties it discusses. It could also be argued that this language does have 
political consequences when the public accepts and determines its behaviour on the 
notion of human rights and the needs for humanitarian interventions. 
Which brings us to the notion of right, the other part of the expression “human 
rights”. A “considerable consensus amongst rights advocates” defines rights “initially, 
as a justified claim or entitlement” (Orend, 2002, p. 17). This definition sets rights as 
needing the existence of others in order to be, for otherwise, there is no point in 
issuing a claim7 when there is no one to grant or contest it, and neither there is in 
bothering to justify it; since we articulate justifications in order to persuade others of 
the legitimacy –another concept ultimately needing of the existence of others– of our 
claims8. It would be hard to conceive of rights without the existence of others to 
grant or contest them. The notion of rights, inasmuch as it relates the claimant to 
others, could then be called a relational concept, one that cannot exist without the 
presence of others. The existence of others is necessary because these justified claims 
pertain to and compel the behaviour of others. The fundamental way through which 
human beings regulate their collective behaviour is through social organization, 
which putting forward rules, prescriptions, rights and laws gives rise to its own 
political nature. Once a given justification for a certain claim is generally accepted 
within an organized collectivity, it is codified as law, and thus becomes a legal right, 
																																																																		
6 A very clear example of this is the following definition of human rights from a UN document 
aimed at offering “a thorough legal analysis and guidance” to all sort of actors, including states, on the 
application of human rights law: “These rights, which are inherent in all human beings, whatever their 
nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other 
status, are interrelated, interdependent and indivisible. They are often expressed and guaranteed by 
law, in the form of treaties, customary international law, general principles and soft law.” (the 
emphases are mine). (OHCHR, 2011, p. 5). 
7 The Oxford English Dictionary gives two definitions of “claim” as a noun: (1) “an assertion that 
something is true” and (2) “a demand or request for something considered one’s due”. It is in this 
second sense that we are considering the term. 
8 Further practical proof of this could be found in how we automatically respond with a “why” any 
time anyone states having a right to something. 
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becoming its fulfillment also a political matter. Human rights are deeply political 
inasmuch as they are a clear command on how to treat other human beings that 
aspires to become law, and thus incontestable in daily practice. 
What human rights are and how they are justified –or not– form a vast field of 
theoretical work in itself that cannot be addressed here. For the purposes of this 
thesis, human rights are an incontestable international legal given affecting national9 
political spaces, and one that presents an extra-legal claim of universality in 
attributing those rights to all human beings, independently of whether their political 
membership acknowledges them or not. 
In choosing to focus on the universality of human rights, I consciously avoid 
discussions over the notion of human dignity, natural law, cultural relativism and 
human rights, or even the accusations hurled at them of cultural and political 
imperialism. All these matters belong to the content and results of declaring human 
rights to be held by every human being, as well as to the foundations and 
justifications of their existence. However, my interest lies in the political 
consequences of granting rights –a notion necessarily contained within a common 
legal and political framework– to every single human being independently of their 
political condition or citizenship.  
This becomes more apparent when the drafting process of the UNDHR is 
examined closely. The 1948 declaration was meant to be a practical document. In 
order to achieve this goal, the philosophical grounding was often neglected for the 
sake of expediency, to the point that philosopher Jacques Maritain, who was heavily 
involved in the drafting of the declaration, recalled that: “It is related that at one of 
the meetings of a Unesco National Commission where Human Rights were being 
discussed, someone expressed astonishment that certain champions of violently 
opposed ideologies had agreed on a list of those rights. ‘Yes’, they said, “we agree 
about the rights but on condition that no one asks us why’. The ‘why’ is where the 
argument begins.” (Maritain et. al., 1948, p. I). Glendon (1999) quotes more 
significant evidence of this: 
“The Commission's Chair, Eleanor Roosevelt, quickly realized that the group would have to 
concentrate on specifics if the project was to stay on course. She steered the discussion back to 
the problem of organizing the group's work schedule. Thereafter, the question of foundations 
surfaced only sporadically. One such occasion was the presentation of a discussion draft by 
																																																																		
9 I choose to focus on national political spaces due to the nation-state nature of our contemporary 
world, but a parallel reasoning could be made for any other sort of political form of organization. 
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the Secretariat of the U.N. Human Rights Division. Australia's Colonel Roy Hodgson 
demanded to know what was the philosophy behind the paper: "What principles did they 
adopt; what method did they follow?" John Humphrey, the Canadian head of the Human 
Rights Division, replied that the draft "was based on no philosophy whatsoever." It was, he 
said, merely a collection from existing constitutions of "every conceivable right which the 
Drafting Committee might want to discuss." At the very end of the drafting process, and 
without much discussion, the Commissioners did make a statement about the basis of human 
rights in the Preamble to the 1948 Declaration. (...) The word "dignity" appears at so many key 
points in the Declaration that many scholars believe it represents the Declaration's ultimate 
value. Louis Henkin puts it this way: "Eschewing –in its quest for universality– explicit 
reliance on Divine inspiration or on Natural Rights, the Declaration provided the idea of 
human rights with a universally acceptable foundation, an ur principle, human dignity.” (the 
emphasis is mine) 
It is this “ur principle” that makes human rights unfathomable beyond 1948 that 
in effect enshrines an incontestable notion of human dignity that, in turn, endangers 
the justificatory element all rights must have. For when the justification to a right 
cannot be fully assessed it becomes doctrine and endangers its legitimacy. This has 
led Mary Ann Glendon (1999) to conclude that “the human rights project will rest on 
shaky foundations unless and until philosophers and statespersons collaborate on 
the business that the framers left unfinished.” 
It might be objected that I have not truly entered into the discussion over whether 
dignity is a valid notion for grounding human rights or not. After all, if we are to talk 
about rights, it is the reasons behind them that must be examined. Though I 
acknowledge the long tradition surrounding the concept that continues up to this 
day, dignity in itself is no legal concept. Though widely acknowledged to be “the 
foundation of human rights”, it is nowhere to be found in legal documents beyond 
the preambles or moral addenda to an article. It is not defined in any manner, only 
invoked as an inalienable property of being human. Surely enough, the concept is 
being used and shaped though juridical balancing in pactice (McCrudden, 2008), but 
the resulting doctrine has not been enshrined in a concrete definition anywhere yet. 
This thesis is concerned with the political impact of concrete juridical results that can 
be assessed and contested as the basis for political action. Though human dignity is 
an indisputable part of human rights, its ambiguity makes it flexible and hard to 
ground any concrete practice on it. 
What could appear as a simple enough act of declaring and prescribing a set of 
rights for every human being alive also implied a revolution in the way that 
fundamental rights have been conceived in previous declarations, and this is the 
main source of the problems that this thesis addresses. I fully agree with Samuel 
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Moyn –and indeed ground this thesis– on the following: 
True, the conceptual foundation of rights even before the Universal Declaration may have 
been natural or even “human” for some thinkers, especially at the high tide of Enlightenment 
rationalism. But even then, it was universally agreed that those rights were to be achieved 
through the construction of spaces of citizenship in which rights were accorded and protected. 
These spaces not only provided ways to contest the denial of already established rights; just as 
crucially, they were also zones of struggle over the meaning of that citizenship, and the place 
where defenses of old rights, like campaigns for new ones, were fought. In contrast, human 
rights after 1945 established no comparable citizenship space, certainly not at the time of their 
invention—and perhaps not since. If so, the central event in human rights history is the 
recasting of rights as entitlements that might contradict the sovereign nation-state from above 
and outside rather than serve as its foundation. (Moyn, 2012, p. 13). 
In declaring human rights to be universal, held equally and inalienably by all 
human beings independently of their political membership, a new sphere or moral 
authority of indeterminate political might was created above the nation-states 
through which mankind currently conducts its political existence. The consequences 
of this new source of rights enabling every single human being on Earth to contest 
the authority of the nation-state involve at least the two different problems that this 
thesis discusses. 
In order to assess the implications discussed above, the thesis will first examine 
Carl Schmitt’s notions of the political and the sovereign (chapter I). Schmitt defines 
the domain of the political as that where a people is able to configure itself in 
opposition to an enemy that has conflicting interests of a potentially existential 
nature. The domain of the political is under the constant watch of a sovereign that 
steps into action as last resort when it understands circumstances demand 
exceptional measures to preserve the body politic. I will argue that, since human 
rights mostly forbid killing enemies (any human being), they render the Schmittian 
domain of the political void and distort the ability of a political community to act in 
its own interests. The role of the sovereign is also usurped by a foreign authority 
whose main role is not to serve the body politic. I claim this presents a risk of serious 
dysfunction for the nation-state. 
Following this, we will look into Hannah Arendt’s discussion of the inherent 
contradiction within the notion of human rights as being held by every single human 
for the sake of their existence, and stress how human beings cannot possibly expect 
to receive protection for their rights due only to their “bare humanity” (Arendt, 
1985), and the need for political membership in order to acquire the most basic right 
on which any other can be grounded, “the right to have rights” (chapter II). 
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The thesis concludes with an example of how these problems are present in real 
life human rights crises examining some aspects of the 2015 refugee crises in Europe 
(chapter III). Contrary to what human rights organizations argue when regarding the 
events of the summer of 2015 as an issue of human rights being violated, I will 
contend that these initially apparent violations of human rights underscore the 
deeper problems and contradictions that human rights carry within themselves that I 
have discussed in this thesis. 
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I. A Distortion of the Political 
 
The Interwar period in Germany (1919-1939) was a fertile ground for thinking 
about the nature and the role of the state in public life, as the Weimar Republic 
underwent siege by radical forces and ended with Adolf Hitler becoming chancellor 
and proclaiming the Third Reich in 1933, thus closing this brief democratic 
experiment in Germany’s history. Hailing from a realist tradition that stressed the 
role of the state as guarantor of the survival of the polity that included Niccolò 
Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, the German jurist Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) 
became interested early on in the underlying forces that preexist, underlie, and 
configure the structure of the state. A successful jurist already before this period, his 
Political Theology (1922) introduced his conception of the role the sovereign should 
play in a democracy, on which I will rely to articulate a possible critique to the notion 
of the universality of human rights. This paved the ground for his successive critique 
of parliamentary democracy with Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923) and his 
most famous work The Concept of the Political (1927). I will also draw from the 
distinction between friend/enemy in the realm of the political  that he developed in 
this last essay. With the dawn of the Nazi regime, he joined the party and reached 
prominent positions in the German academia thanks to his political positioning, 
eventually being perceived as the Crown Jurist of the Nazi Germany (Vinx, 2016). He 
was eventually sidelined in 1936 due to internecine struggles within the party, 
though he kept loudly supporting the regime (Sherrat, 2012), and was shunned from 
the academia after the war. However controversial, his critique of liberalism has 
witnessed renewed interest in the academic world since the 1990’s, and most of his 
pre-1930’s work is being rediscovered. 
Two key concepts in the thought of Carl Schmitt bear particular relevance to our 
discussion of the problem of the universality of human rights: that of the political, 
and his depiction of the sovereign. A look into how either of these concepts is affected 
by the notion of universal human rights would shed some light into how the latter 
may potentially become an obstacle to the proper running of the state, and even to its 
survival. We will now examine how these concepts could work. 
Schmitt circumscribes the political as one of the essential realms of human 
activity marked –though not exhausted– by the distinction between friend and 
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enemy (Schmitt, 2007, p. 26). All actions and motivations within this realm could 
ultimately be reduced to this distinction. An enemy in these terms is not someone 
with merely opposing interests or opinions –”a debating adversary” (Schmitt, 2007, 
p. 28)–, but those with whom the nature of our antagonism can potentially and 
ultimately reach the point of physical annihilation. The enemy for Schmitt is an 
“other” with whom we establish a relationship of mutual negation, someone who 
intends to negate our own way of life and thus must be repelled as an existential 
threat. Whether this enemy is also morally evil, ugly, or an economic rival or not is 
irrelevant to this definition –although, should any of these domains become so 
intense as to be able to group men along the distinction friend/enemy, they would be 
in effect acquiring a political quality (Schmitt, 2007, p. 36). What marks a 
relationship as political is its potential –its constant tension– to escalate the friend-
enemy distinction to its maximum consequences –the physical eradication of either 
side, war as an “existential negation of the enemy” (Schmitt, 2007, p. 33)–, and the 
behaviors this possibility determines. Schmitt is very clear that this is no symbolic 
relationship, but a concrete and existential one: 
“The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that 
of friend and enemy. This provides a definition in the sense of a criterion and not as an 
exhaustive definition.” (Schmitt, 2007, p. 26). 
And, for good measure, Schmitt actually refers to a “real possibility” of killing 
enemies: 
 The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they 
refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity. War is the existential 
negation of the enemy. It is the most extreme consequence of enmity. It does not have to be 
common, normal, something ideal, or desirable. But it must nevertheless remain a real 
possibility for as long as the concept of the enemy remains valid. (Schmitt, 2007, p. 33) 
The political is also a public distinction originally possible between peoples 
fighting an external enemy –which in turn would give rise to their consciousness as a 
people–, but also potentially an internal distinction between political parties within a 
state. It is not a personal distinction, but one brought about by group relations: “A 
private person has no political enemies” (Schmitt, 2007, p. 51). In this case, the 
conflict threatens the integrity of the political entity, putting it at risk of dissolution 
through fragmentation, or termination qua political.  
It is for this reason that, in order to preserve the integrity of the polity at all cost 
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(Schmitt, 2005, p. 6), a sovereign needs to exist. The “highest power” in a state is to 
Schmitt “he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt, 2005, p.5). The sovereign is 
conceived as an indivisible and underlying pre-legal power that steps into action in 
those concrete cases where the existence of the state is threatened by a situation 
where the law flounders. Its defining prerogative is suspending the legal order, and 
determining when such a circumstance takes place and how it is to be resolved: 
(…) not every extraordinary measure, not every police emergency measure or emergency 
decree, is necessarily an exception. What characterizes an exception is principally unlimited 
authority, which means the suspension of the entire legal order. In such situation it is clear 
that the state remains, whereas law recedes. Because the exception is different from anarchy 
and chaos, order in the juristic sense still prevails even if it is not of the ordinary kind 
(Schmitt, 2005, p. 12). 
An important element underlying Schmitt’s idea of the political and the sovereign 
that cannot be ignored before discussing how the universality of human rights affects 
these concepts is his view of the state as a factuality of power passed on through 
generations that preexists the emergence of law. He often insists in understanding 
different “sociological” aspects of the state (Schmitt, 2005, p. 22). With this he 
means no less that men, in essence, are ruled by other men, and not by “spiritual 
forces (...) emanating from men’s sense of right” (Schmitt, 2005, p. 22). Sovereign 
power is categorically concrete in its manifestations, and cannot be reduced to a 
system of division of powers and checks and balances come the moment of the 
decision on the exception; as well as “the connection of actual power with the legally 
highest power [being] the fundamental problem of the concept of sovereignty” 
(Schmitt, 2005, p. 18). There needs to be concrete people making concrete decisions 
on the legal order when the time comes. This will conform the substrate of his further 
critique to liberalism –and his discussion of dictatorship– as a system incapable of 
making decisions and falling into paralysis due to its multiple legal safeguards when 
the time to act comes. Though not at all alien to our discussion, this critique is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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The universality of human rights as a suspension of the 
friend/enemy distinction 
 
I consider that the universality of human rights, in imposing a blanket limitation 
on what can be done to an enemy, poses a direct challenge to both Schmittian 
concepts of the political and the sovereign. The political becomes diluted in the 
universal equality of all men –an indistinctness that bars the ascertainment of 
friends and enemies in the Schmittian sense–, and the almost deletion of the 
possibility of ultimately reaching the stage of physical confrontation with enemies 
deprives it of its source of energy. At the same time, the sovereign can no longer 
resort to unrestrained power in order to save the polity from those threatening its 
existence, but is now bound by an external higher sovereign that is indifferent to the 
fate of the state. This last element is particularly noxious, since the ability to use 
power unrestrained –of determining “the exception”– is a defining attribute of being 
sovereign. Human rights, qua limitation of authority, present the sovereign with the 
existential contradiction of not being able to fully act as sovereign. 
In particular, the UDHR states in its article 3 that “everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of person.” (See Appendix 1). This overarching right was later 
rephrased in the ICCPR as: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This 
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”, and 
later developed in the General Comments as impossible to subject to any derogation. 
The focus of this right then might appear as not on an absolute right to life, but on an 
absolute right not to have it taken arbitrarily10. The comments and the convention 
also impose a “supreme duty” on states to “prevent wars”. It circumscribes this right 
to the national legal order, one supposedly based upon international human rights 
law, thus entering in a sort of recursive cycle. This right leaves a degree of flexibility 
for the state of war, where it coexists and coapplies together with international 
humanitarian law.  
Focusing on the political, we could consider that restricting to the point of 
remoteness the possibility of eventually resorting to physically eliminating the enemy 
consubstantial to the universality of human rights11 deactivates the realm of the 
																																																																		
10 With all the practical problems a situation of institutional uncertainty or combat poses to this 
requirement. 
11 It could be argued that the ban on killing is not a feature of the universality of human rights –as 
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political in taking away the tension such possibility creates. This tension is what 
constitutes the realm of the political, keeping its participants constantly aware of the 
real possibility of a deadly escalation and thus constantly motivated to avert it, and 
trying to anticipate possible risks. The possibility, the threat, of a situation being 
liable to eventually reaching the point of physical destruction must be present –must 
be consciously considered, if not taken as a permanent given– for the political to 
exist. A world without this distinction is a world without politics, Schmitt will remind 
us (Schmitt, 2007, pp. 53-54). Once the political ceases to be an existential matter, it 
becomes guided and tainted by the distinctions that define other realms of human 
activity, i.e. good and evil (morality), beautiful and ugly (aesthetics) or profitable and 
unprofitable (economics). Once the political is deactivated, it ceases to serve its main 
purpose of recognizing and protecting the polity from its enemies. This presents an 
existential matter, since there is no escape from the political; enemies need to be 
marked as such in order to be watched and their potentially harmful actions 
preempted, or else a people who has lost this ability will “vanish from the world” as a 
political entity –and thus as a people12–, one aware of itself as distinct and capable of 
																																																																																																																																																																																																													
we are set to explore– per se but one particular content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
of 1948, and that thus, this argument should not belong in a critique of the universality of human 
rights. 
However, the opposite of the right to life being universal would be that not everyone is entitled to this 
right, which would leave the interpretation on who is fit to bear it or not to the legal systems of the 
states (as they actually do in states where death penalty, frowned upon but tolerated by the 
Conventions, exists). However, being this right the most basic existential precondition for a human 
being to enjoy any right –and no other rights being able to be enjoyed without this precondition–, 
stating the right to life is not universal would rend moot any other predication of universality for any 
other right. Thus, the right to life is a necessary part of the very notion of the universality of human 
rights, since no right can be universal unless the right to life is upheld. Whether someone is entitled or 
not to any right touches directly upon another declared feature of human rights: their inalienability, that 
is that they cannot be taken away from their bearers (each and every individual belonging to 
humanity), though they can be regulated or limited. Now, defining the right to life as both inalienable 
and subject to limitations (i.e. when the sovereign determines an exception) in a declaration of human 
rights, would be in itself oxymoronic, for the right to life, unlike other rights that can be regulated more 
or less accordingly to circumstances, is one that admits no regulation: it can either be enjoyed or 
radically curtailed –as one is either dead or alive, but cannot be in an intermediate state–, but not be 
regulated and, simultaneously, retain its universally inalienable quality (for the moment an individual is 
deemed not to have it, this right ceases to be universal). If a right is alienable it also means is liable to 
not being universal the very moment it is alienated from someone. The right to life being then 
unlimited by nature becomes inalienable, and thus universal in full. The right to life is necessarily 
contained in the universality of human rights also through its non-negotiable regulation that turns into 
necessary inalienability. This is part due to the fact that this right is stating a human quality rather than 
predicating a claim upon it, and it is actually a negative right. 
12 Schmitt brings the examples of the French nobility before the revolution “sentimentalizing” about 
the “virtue of the masses” and that “man is good by nature”; or of the Russian nobility romanticizing 
the Russian peasant in the eve of the revolution. As history proved, these two groups (French and 
Russian peasantry) would prove themselves to be pure Schmittian enemies to an aristocracy that 
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asserting and defending its existence.  
If a people no longer possesses the energy or the will to maintain itself in the sphere of 
politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the world. Only a weak people will disappear. 
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 53) 
I must insist that Schmitt is very careful to stress that an enemy is someone with 
whom potentially the existential incompatibility of our interests could escalate to the 
point of physical elimination. The real value for the state of the Schmittian 
friend/enemy distinction does not lie in the moment hostilities break, but in the 
ability of the polity –or the political grouping in question– to foresee such 
possibilities when dealing with a group different from itself. The utility of this 
distinction is that of compelling the polity to ruthlessly ask itself the question of 
whether they are entering in a political relationship with another group –i.e. one 
where their respective interests could potentially escalate into physical 
incompatibility; in assessing their respective interests and acting preemptively in 
order to avoid such damaging outcome. Should this be the case, the polity would then 
be able to recognize such risks. 
In a Schmittian framework, I consider human rights would then become utterly 
political in the sense that they present a threat to the tension necessary for the 
domain of the political to work and to perform its existential function of preserving 
the polity. Human rights impede the friend-enemy distinction in putting limits to a 
hostile action that would then deter a political enemy. In doing so, they take away 
the motivation –the mutual deterrence– to avoid the supreme damage of war –for 
once the possibility of killing is made remote, there are hardly any enemies in the 
purest sense– and will dilute the domain of politics into other domains (economy, 
religion, culture, art…). At the same time, hindering the ability of a political entity to 
discriminate between friend and enemy will threaten its disappearance, for losing the 
will to acknowledge the existence of an enemy does not make the enemy go away. 
As he pointed that the general concept of humanity excludes that of an enemy –
since no distinction can be made within it, all humans being the same and deserving 
a similar minimum treatment that cannot be forfeited in advance–, Schmitt would go 
as far as to acuse this concept of being an ideological tool for “imperialist expansion” 
																																																																																																																																																																																																													
allowed the values of other domains (aestheticism, Christian charity…) to taint their perception of the 
political nature of their relation, and thus prevented them from taking enough measures or restricting 
their own action in order to avoid their fate. 
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(Schmitt, 2007, p. 54), a critique echoed by contemporary attacks on human rights 
policies –usually from those forced to abide to them– arguing that they are nothing 
but political actions disguised as humanitarian interventions13; a Schmittian could 
interpret this to mean these interventions are aimed at preventing a polity from 
recognizing or acting against its enemies. A closer look at those arguments shows 
they usually involve a state or a warring faction precisely using their survival as a 
reason to violate the human rights of those marked as enemies. The Schmittian view 
of the political then leads directly to a raison d’etat incompatible with any limits to 
the action of the state. However, Schmitt also criticizes wars in the name of 
humanity14 as an excuse to behave inhumanely: 
“To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a term probably has certain 
incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him 
to be an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme 
inhumanity.” (Schmitt, 2007, p. 54) 
An usurped sovereign 
 
Human rights also present a strong contradiction for the state in that they pervert 
the role of the sovereign. The Schmittian sovereign is meant to exist beyond the legal 
order, which it can suspend when he judges it necessary to preserve the survival of 
the state, while maintaining his authority. However, human rights claim to reside in 
a legal order –one that is universal– that is inescapable to the sovereign in that it 
cannot be suspended in principle because human dignity, understood as an 
inalienable feature of being human, cannot be suspended. However, international 
human rights law does allow for suspending most of the human rights regime with a 
few core exceptions15. More concretely, the ICCPR states that, among others, the 
rights to life, freedom from torture and undignified treatment, freedom from slavery, 
and that of having a juridical person with minimum guarantees are non-derogable 
																																																																		
13 The case of NATO bombings on Serbia in 1999, where overwhelming air power was used to 
bring to a halt the killing and displacement of Albanians by the Serbian army in its counterinsurgency 
campaign against Albanian guerrillas is a clear-cut case of such a military intervention in the name of 
human rights. And yet, Serbian nationalists did argue –in a fully Schmittian way– they were acting 
upon armed enemies –they had reached the point of hostilties and their existential interests appeared 
as mutually incompatible– and preserving the unity of their polity. And the subsequent loss of Kosovo 
in the aftermath of the campaign could be seen as proof of the truth of these claims as well as of the 
Serbian failure to do this. 
14 Or “humanitarian wars”, as they have bloomed in the decades following the Soviet collapse. 
15 Which would appear to signal a bow to the needs of the sovereign. 
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even in times of risk for “ In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation” (the emphasis is mine) (International Covenant… 1966). To these, the 
prohibition of typical forms of discrimination is added (race, sex, language, 
religion…). The General Comments establish further strict limits on the ability to 
derogate these rights and adds the obligation to notify the Human Rights Committee 
of the UN as well as all other signatory parts to the agreement (General Comments, 
pp. 235-239) in order to assess: 
in particular (...) whether the measures taken by the State party were strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, but also to permit other States parties to monitor compliance with 
the provisions of the Covenant. In view of the summary character of many of the notifications 
received in the past, the Committee emphasizes that the notification by States parties should 
include full information about the measures taken and a clear explanation of the reasons for 
them, with full documentation attached regarding their law. (General Comments, 239) 
 Schmitt (2005, p.1) defines the sovereign as “he who decides on the exception”, 
to the point that he rejects Max Weber’s attribution to the state of the monopoly of 
violence as sufficient, but instead: 
Therein resides the essence of the state's sovereignty, which must be juristically defined 
correctly, not as the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide. The 
exception reveals most dearly the essence of the state's authority. The decision parts here 
from the legal norm, and (to formulate it paradoxically) authority proves that to produce law 
it need not be based on law. (Schmitt, 2005, p. 13) 
 In violating this sovereign attribute of deciding when the legal order is suspended 
–in their claim of  exemption to sovereign suspension–, human rights give rise to a 
severe challenge to the authority of the sovereign –and usually in extremely delicate 
moments in which the sovereign is attempting to materialize itself in defense of the 
survival of the polity– that risks derailing the “order in the juristic sense” that the 
presence of the latter ensures even once the legal order has been suspended; and 
thus risking chaos and the disintegration of the polity. This “order in the juristic 
sense” is how Schmitt (2005, p. 12) described the preservation of the material fiction 
of the state when a state of exception is invoked. Once the legal order is suspended by 
the sovereign, it might seem like a state of lawlessness would ensue, and that the 
restraint it commanded is gone; but the very tangible presence of the state, the 
“juristic sense”  that its raw power instills in all those under its domain, remains.  
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Human rights law presents itself as being above the sovereign, placing –as we 
have seen– a claim to survey how its suspension is carried out, and implicitly 
reserving the right to contest it. Moreover, this limitation to the ability of the 
sovereign “to decide on the exception”, grants all members of the polity the ability to 
challenge the authority of this “juristic sense” –raw state power– that remains in a 
state of exception; to instill a claim of rebellion against the sovereign decision 
empowering every individual with a set of rights that cannot be subjected to 
exception. All this, we should not forget, at an extremely delicate time of emergency 
when –we should assume– the sovereign calls for the state of exception in order to 
protect the very existence of the polity. Human rights thus present themselves as an 
obstacle to this end in posing an added burden to a sovereign that needs to act with 
urgency, and even negating its defining role as the decider on the exception. 
Moreover, the ban over the physical elimination of the enemy –until undesirable 
and very unlikely circumstances concur– presents an added problem. Human rights 
are clear in heavily restricting the possibility or physically destroying the enemy, but 
they by no means preclude the possibility of the enemy choosing to ignore these 
restrictions and destroying us in the meantime: the life of the political enemy needs 
be respected, but we have no guarantee at all that our enemy will respect ours, other 
than their supposed willingness to respect our human rights. However, should they 
define us as an enemy –and we should expect them to proceed this way–, it is not the 
safest course of action to expect them to respect our rights –and indeed the fact that 
we find ourselves in an existential conflict means they too should define us as enemy, 
thus giving rise to their need of eventually eliminating us physically. The stakes being 
so high, it should not come as a surprise that so few choose to risk a virtuous death 
upholding the rights of their enemies in an open conflict. Human rights could be said 
to present an incomplete command –one with no guarantees of reciprocity– to 
respect the life of an enemy in most circumstances –to, in a sense, stop regarding 
him as such– while not guaranteeing that our own rights will be respected. In 
banning killing in such an incomplete manner16, human rights are not only derailing 
the necessary tension for the political to function –and thus, i.e., to bring about a 
satisfactory peace settlement– but they are threatening the sovereign and the 
survival of the state by placing an impossible dilemma upon the sovereign: either 
																																																																		
16 The international community can only act through compliance from each state; but it is the 
quality of a sovereign to suspend the national juridical order that includes abeyance to international 
agreements. 
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inhibit itself as such and abide by human rights –thus ceasing to be fully sovereign in 
its ability to “decide on the exception”–, or either risk physical destruction. 
Moreover, the inability of human rights to guarantee that compliance with them is 
not a potentially lethal disadvantage while still challenging the ability of the 
sovereign to decide on the exception and how to carry it out, gives rise to a power 
vacuum within those states respecting them in a situation of conflict that further 
threatens the ability of the state to survive17. In sum, the effect of human rights upon 
the political and the sovereign –which we could call a suspension of the political– 
directly impinge on the basic ability of the state –and even all political actors– for 
self-preservation, thus presenting an existential threat to those inhabiting the 
political. 
 
A valuable approach 
 
I believe a Schmittian approach to the universality of human rights renders some 
valuable insights that can be applied to the assessment of how to apply international 
law or formulate national policies. I consider the notion of the political particularly 
valuable when it comes to understanding intergroup relations because it calls our 
attention to the raw interests of the parts and cautions us to consider whether there 
might be foreign elements to this analysis guiding the behaviour of the parts 
involved. The ability to establish a reasoned friend/enemy distinction could render 
valuable analysis, help to prevent future conflicts and act as a reminder of the main 
interests of a given society. I consider the popularization of what is normally called 
“human rights talk” counterproductive, for it tends to bring together ideas, concepts 
and arguments from the domains of morality and arts into the Schmittian political. 
The ideological triumph of human rights spearheaded by human rights organizations 
has tainted with morality the domain of the political, hindering the ability of 
contemporary Western societies to consider their core political interests. Identifying 
an enemy in the Schmittian sense does not mean to become immediately hostile to it, 
but to watch it. Behaviour towards an enemy can be exquisite, humane, polite, 
generous and even friendly: “The enemy in the political sense need not be hated 
																																																																		
17 A concrete scenario for this could be imagined in a conflict facing a party respecting human 
rights with another who doesn’t, at clear disadvantage in practical terms for the former. 
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personally, and in the private sphere only does it make sense to love one’s enemy, 
i.e., one’s adversary” (Schmitt, 2007, p. 29). The point Schmitt tries to make is that of 
focusing on an intellectual analysis on the most likely objective interests of different 
groups18. This motivation, taken in the right civic spirit could even contribute to a 
regeneration of politics. For this to be possible, I believe human rights should be 
reassessed in the conscience of the public, not as derived from a notion of human 
dignity of quasi-mystical status, but as what they are: international agreements of 
immense merit aimed at securing minimum conditions of wellbeing that we have 
agreed to find desirable for our moral progress. 
 Moreover I believe the notion of the political can shed light upon a common 
contemporary grievance on the growing emptiness of politics, losing its aim and 
becoming enmeshed in, among others, culture wars, the tide of “identity politics”, 
moral outrage or simple non-issues derived from the sphere of entertainment. The 
political, as unpalatable as it might seem draws our attention to the liminal nature of 
what binds a human society existentially: the need to protect their common interests 
from those of others who may negate them. A human society is much more than that, 
but it is built upon the minimum need to ultimately guarantee the safety of its 
members and the integrity of what keeps them as a group capable or articulating its 
own sovereign interests. A matter for further study could be how precisely 
contemporary populist movements have garnered support precisely rescuing the 
distinction friend/enemy, and have enjoyed complete freedom to twist it in their 
favour, for no force of other political sign appears to have even attempted to dispute 
their self-appointed monopoly over the concept. 
Human rights restrain the action of the state sovereign towards its own people, in 
preventing all sorts of arbitrary deadly behaviour, and that is a good thing, as there is 
a vast array of examples attesting to the perils of conceding unrestrained power to 
any state actor (i.e. the 1970’s in Latin America). After all, that was the guiding goal 
of the 1948 declaration: protecting the most vulnerable from abuse by the state. 
But I think that, in criticizing how state behaviour is to be scrutinized in its 
compliance with human rights standards, the notion of the sovereign does bear 
interesting fruit. Firstly, it underscores the need to assess who and where is the 
sovereign and whether it is actually acting as a sovereign, i.e. attempting to ensure 
the survival of the polity. This analysis takes us well beyond an accumulation of 
																																																																		
18 A thought that could be summed up in the distinction realist/idealist in international relations. 
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individual instances of violations of human rights, and reminds us that a viable state 
is also a precondition for the enjoyment of these rights19 –which is indirectly 
recognized in article 29 of the UDHR. Surely the rights of every individual, 
particularly in times of emergency, are to be the priority. But this should not make us 
lose sight of the need to preserve a framework capable of doing so. And, secondly, 
clearly bearing in mind what the role of a sovereign is might also act as warning as to 
when a sovereign might not be behaving as such, but acting outside the domain of 
the political. Of course this is taken into account today in contemporary analysis, but 
I believe considering the notion of a sovereign acting on a political domain can add 
depth to our contemporary analysis of issues where human rights are involved. 
* * * 
Thus, after reviewing Schmitt’s concepts of the political and the sovereign, we end 
with two disrupting effects of the idea of the universality of human rights, emanating 
from its deep political consequences. On one side, universal human rights threaten to 
dismantle the realm of the political, which is both the driving force and the threat 
warning system of a political entity. On the other, they set limits and enable the 
questioning of the authority of the sovereign usually in moments of extreme peril to 
the survival of the polity, and so furthering the existential challenge to the state they 
already pose. 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																																		
19 As the relatively recent –and unforgivably mindless– destruction of the Iraqi state by the US in 
the Second Iraq War (2003-2011) painfully reminds us. 
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II. A Paradoxical Right to Have Rights 
 
After examining how Schmitt’s concepts of the political and the sovereign are 
disrupted by the universality of human rights, we now turn to how Hannah Arendt’s 
paradox of human rights, whose effects she proposed to counter with the right to 
have rights, poses a different sort of critique to this concept. It is one still grounded 
in the fact that human rights ultimately come to be within the framework of the 
nation-state, thus making them unenforceable should the state refuse to do so. This 
would invalidate their declared universality and inalienability. Although her thought 
differs notably from Schmitt’s, they both agree in pointing out that the law becomes 
superseded by sovereign authority (either the sovereign itself in the case of Schmitt, 
or the national authority in the case of Arendt) when it comes to a claim to human 
rights that is not in the interest of the state. While Schmitt adopts the perspective of 
the sovereign and the political, Arendt strikes to the core of the issue asking how can 
human rights be inalienable and universal when their actualization depends on the 
will of the states. The striking similarities between the refugee crises that took place 
during the interwar period in Europe, and the present plight of the 65.6 million 
displaced people in the world today (United Nations, n.d.) merit that we pay close 
attention to Arendt’s critique of human rights in an attempt to understand how and 
why human rights still fail to be guaranteed in such dramatic cases today, when their 
enforcement is most needed. We will also examine how her critique still poses a 
problem to the notion of the universality of human rights. 
Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) grounded her critique to human rights on her 
personal experience as a Jewish German refugee and subsequently stateless person 
between fleeing Nazi Germany in 1933 and her final escape to the US in 1941. She 
would not regain a nationality until becoming an American citizen in 1951. Her work 
for Jewish refugee organizations during that period allowed her to witness first-hand 
the persecution and mistreatment by European governments of those who had been 
deprived of membership of a political community –a state– to protect them during 
the 1930s.  
Her critique begins in the ninth chapter of The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(Arendt, 1985), where she condenses the consequences of the Minority Treaties 
signed after World War I that placed in the hands of the League of Nations the 
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responsibility for guaranteeing the basic rights of the national minorities that found 
themselves under the authority of a nation state run by another titular, ethnic group 
after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and the Ottoman empires at the 
end of the conflict. The Minority Treaties meant that 30 million people in Europe 
came to live under governments who were not directly or legally obliged to protect 
their fundamental rights. Moreover, encouraged by the logic of monoethnicity 
behind the creation of national states, these governments sought in the beginning 
every excuse to expel these minorities, and resorted later to massive policies of 
denaturalization, creating a constant flow of stateless people that eroded the meagre 
mechanisms, namely granting asylum status, that European states had in place in 
order to deal with what up to then had been an exceptional case. 
Ironically, the direct protection of the League of Nations over these people was 
deemed “a temporary enforcement of human rights necessary as a compromise and 
exception” (Arendt, 1985, p. 276) since the older Western European countries 
considered it necessary to apply extraordinary protections to fundamental rights only 
in those newly created countries that lacked a tradition of protecting them. This 
created one of the many paradoxes Arendt saw in the stubborn rhetoric of the Rights 
of Man20 during the 1930s –despite overwhelming evidence of their dysfunction–,  
and one that encapsulates the essential parts of her critique. The problem can be 
approached from a Schmittian perspective. The new nation-states were sovereign in 
their territories; the League of Nations, charged with ensuring the fundamental 
rights of the minorities, was not. As a result, the stateless and refugees were placed in 
the care of a non-existing sovereign as such (the League of Nations), but under the 
authority of another21 who had every interest in getting rid of them, since their 
presence represented precisely a challenge to its sovereignty –the stateless of a 
different ethnicity who would not be integrated into the nation. Moreover, their 
presence as stateless immediately violated the logic of the political as we have seen in 
the previous chapter: those who do not belong to the nation or to the body politic 
cannot be anything else but potential and even eventual enemies22. The increasingly 
																																																																		
20 Throughout her discussion of the historical origins of human rights, Arendt will refer to them as 
they were declared in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen from 1789. I have kept 
her terminology when referring to her work, stressing only the part “and Citizen” when I consider it 
relevant to the argument. 
21 The national governments of the newly-created ethnic states in Central and Eastern Europe who 
regarded those national minorities with growing suspicion. 
22 Even more when minorities organized themselves in a Congress of Organized National Groups 
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hostile treatment refugees and stateless received throughout the 1930s –and until 
the final fate of many, if not most, at the hands of the Nazis– bears witness to this. 
Masses of people who had become “undesirables” or “the scum of the earth” for 
most European governments roamed Europe. Their situation degenerated into a 
constant parading through different countries who would expel them into one 
another, setting in motion a growing series of contradictions Arendt saw in the midst 
of the structure of the nation-state, and indeed “a deadly sickness” (Arendt, 1985, p. 
290). On one side, it created sizeable groups of people in every state to whom the 
laws of the land did not apply. However, nation-states are grounded on the equality 
of all under the law, otherwise the law becomes a system of privileges for some 
against which these states claimed to have risen in their foundational and 
legitimizing narratives. The bigger the presence of people outside the pale of law, the 
starker these contradictions became, and the more appealing the temptation for 
police forces in democratic countries to start behaving similarly to their counterparts 
in totalitarian systems, as they indeed ended up doing (Arendt, 1985, p. 288). On the 
other, the failure of nation states to guarantee the rights of all their residents further 
undermined in practice the notion of fundamental rights, to the point of totalitarian 
regimes in Europe using the sorry appearance and general state of refugees as a 
rhetorical device to discredit de facto the notion of human rights (Arendt, 1985, p. 
269). 
For the stateless, this situation created contradictions too. According to the 
Rights of Man and Citizen (1789), they had inalienable rights that had to be upheld; 
however, since they could not claim any citizenship, they could simply not address 
their claim to anyone. Their inalienable rights could very well exist, and yet no one 
who could do something about them had any interest in whether they were being 
upheld or not. The stateless themselves were aware of this, and many clung to their 
previous citizenships at every turn in an attempt to retain at least the fiction of a legal 
persona that would qualify as bearer of these rights. They were placed in the 
paradoxical situation of being better off in terms of having their rights respected as 
criminals in prison (depositaries of the rights to due process and decent treatment) 
than as mere stateless (Arendt, 1985, p. 286). 
Underlying this situation, Arendt saw a problem at the very heart of the 
foundation of modern nation-states: “the fact that the French Revolution had 
																																																																																																																																																																																																													
in European States, a transnational body attempting to defend their interests (Arendt, 1985, p. 274) 
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combined the declaration of the Rights of Man with national sovereignty” (Arendt, 
1985, p. 272), and made them mutually dependent. 
 
A flaw in the structure of the nation-state 
 
Arendt considers that the proclamations of the Rights of Man in the end of the 
18th century were meant to establish (a) the emancipation of Man from God and any 
of its representatives in the Old Regime; and thus (b) implied the new need to protect 
individuals from “the new sovereignty of the state and new arbitrariness of society” 
when they could no longer be sure of their rights to “equality before God as 
Christians”. 
Since the Rights of Man were proclaimed to be "inalienable," irreducible to and undeducible 
from other rights or laws, no authority was invoked for their establishment; Man himself was 
their source as well as their ultimate goal. No special law, moreover, was deemed necessary to 
protect them because all laws were supposed to rest upon them. Man appeared as the only 
sovereign in matters of law as the people was proclaimed the only sovereign in matters of 
government. The people's sovereignty (different from that of the prince) was not proclaimed 
by the grace of God but in the name of Man, so that it seemed only natural that the 
"inalienable" rights of man would find their guarantee and become an inalienable part of the 
right of the people to sovereign self-government. (Arendt, 1985, p. 291) 
The main “paradox” appeared to lie in the fact that the declarations referred to an 
“abstract” human being who seemed to exist nowhere. As such, it was indefensible 
and, certainly not a stateless person. It did however rest upon a subtler flaw in the 
structure of the nation state. 
Until the French and American proclamations of the Rights of Man and 
throughout the Old Regime, decency of treatment to an individual had been socially 
sanctioned through religion (the notion of Christian treatment and Christianity) and 
custom (norms of hospitality). But with the forces of religion gone, and those of 
custom upended by an accelerating social change set in motion by increasing 
industrialization and the upheaval brought about by the development of new and 
conflicting political identities, the individual found himself under complete 
uncertainty as to how and why to expect decent treatment from others. The 
proclamations of the Rights of Man came to replace the assurances derived from 
God’s central role as the ultimate source of authority (and morality) with “Man 
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himself as their source as well as their ultimate goal” (my emphasis) (Arendt, 1985, 
p. 291). Since Man was the only source of law now, and all individual guarantees 
rested upon this remaining so, the mere fact that the people remained as sovereign 
would by itself guarantee the Rights of Man. Note that it is precisely this last move, 
the assumption that the guaranteeing of individual rights (and thus of an individual 
existence worth protecting) would naturally (and inalienably) happen as long as the 
people became and remained sovereign (for it was also assumed that the people 
could not possibly go against itself; or at least not against its own people), that de 
facto replaced the individual as the original bearer of rights in the declarations of the 
Rights of Man with the nation as both the source and goal of these rights. The Rights 
of Man ceased being inalienable when confronted with the Rights of Nations. The 
individual is indeed sovereign, but only when it legislates and acts as such 
conforming to a people; the individual must then disappear –merge into a people– in 
order to be sovereign –to have his sovereignty secured–, which does not necessarily 
rule out the possibility of a real disappearance as well as that of his rights. This way, 
what was originally meant to protect individuals from abuse, became a tool to protect 
the nation (Schmitt might as well say the sovereign23) from the encroachments of 
individuals. The individual, though apparently fully protected, had become 
completely helpless in the face of the nation it had come to constitute, in a perversion 
of the apparent logic underneath the Rights of Man. 
The whole question of human rights, therefore, was quickly and inextricably blended with the 
question of national emancipation; only the emancipated sovereignty of the people, of one's 
own people, seemed to be able to insure them. As mankind, since the French Revolution, was 
conceived in the image of a family of nations, it gradually became self-evident that the people, 
and not the individual, was the image of man. (…) In other words, man had hardly appeared 
as a completely emancipated, completely isolated being who carried his dignity within himself 
without reference to some larger encompassing order, when he disappeared again into a 
member of a people. (Arendt, 1985, p. 291).  
It is there that the paradox Arendt saw lies. In the nation displacing the individual 
																																																																		
23 Both Arendt and Schmitt share the view that democracy can only be possible within an 
homogenous nation-state (Brunkhorst, 1996). And, indeed, as we have seen, Schmitt cannot 
conceive a political sphere that is not homogenous at least in its capacity to recognize an enemy that 
would negate her. Arendt, in turn, considers “The alien is a frightening symbol of the fact of difference 
as such, of individuality as such, and indicates those realms in which man cannot change and cannot 
act and in which, therefore, he has a distinct tendency to destroy” (Arendt, p. 299), and thus his 
presence is one that generates a desire for violence incompatible with a unified political body. 
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as both the source and the goal of the Rights of Man (those rights being nothing more 
than a device to ultimately protect the nation-state under the guise of the sovereignty 
of the people, and neither of the individual nor to ultimately protect him), man as the 
bearer of rights had become a means to an end, an instrument that could be 
sacrificed in the service of the national interest. It turned out that those rights were 
inalienable as long as one remained a member of a sovereign people, but that same 
membership (as Arendt illustrates with the plight of the stateless and the refugees, 
and the case of massive denationalizations during the interwar period) could itself be 
withdrawn by the nation should it deem it necessary; and of course those assumed 
rights were completely out of the pale of law –thus becoming nothing, since rights as 
an enforceable reality cannot exist outside of a juridical order– when it came to an 
individual who did not belong to any right-guaranteeing nation. Simply put: the 
structure of the nation-state simply precludes in practice the actualization of any 
individual rights that would trump its (sovereign) interests. This membership of the 
state of a sovereign nation (one where individual rights are a means to the survival of 
the nation and so are upheld, and only of the individual as a way to ensure the 
existence of members of a nation as they configure the nation, and necessarily for his 
survival) becomes, however and deeply paradoxically, nothing more and nothing less 
than the very first need the individual has in this world, and thus subject to be 
protected as a right. It is what Arendt would then summarize as the right to have 
rights. 
 
The right to have rights 
 
The loss of these rights would then entail more than the loss of the right to entry 
in a register of citizenship and the very serious and practical implications this 
administrative act carries within. As the world is currently structured through 
nation-states and their networks of bilateral and multilateral agreements, lacking 
membership to any of these nations means lacking membership from all of them, 
which automatically places the stateless in a precarious position everywhere in the 
world. Arendt will remind us that unlike in previous times, when it was possible to 
find asylum in other places, there will be no rest for the stateless, who will always be 
at the mercy of the will of their hosting state. 
 29	
Moreover, the loss of citizenship cannot be compared to the loss of any given civil 
right. It could be argued that civil rights can be violated and even taken away, but 
nevertheless this does not expel their bearer from the domain that makes possible for 
him to lay claim to them (and even have the situation reversed). The problem of the 
rightless is not oppression but lacking someone who would oppress them. Having 
been severed from a political community, they have been severed from mattering to 
anyone else (Arendt, 1985, p. 295). This “mattering” is more than a feeling of 
solitude, but has a deeper existential implication:  
The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in the 
deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective. 
Something much more fundamental than freedom and justice, which are rights of citizens, is 
at stake when belonging to the community into which one is born is no longer a matter of 
course and not belonging no longer a matter of choice, or when one is placed in a situation 
where, unless he commits a crime, his treatment by others does not depend on what he does 
or does not do. This extremity, and nothing else, is the situation of people deprived of human 
rights. They are deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action; not of the 
right to think whatever they please, but of the right to opinion. Privileges in some cases, 
injustices in most, blessings and doom are meted out to them according to accident and 
without any relation whatsoever to what they do, did, or may do. (Arendt, p. 296) 
When Arendt stresses the essential relevance of the loss of the capacity for action, 
she is pointing at one of the basic elements for a shared human life that are distinctly 
human, as she would discuss later on in The Human Condition (Arendt, 1998). The 
loss of what she calls for the first time a “human right” (Arendt, 1985, p. 297) –
unquestionably stressing the literality of the fact that only humans can have it as it is 
having it that makes us human–, mean the loss of the relevance of speech, and thus 
our inability to establish any possible human relationship with others. She would go 
back to Aristotle’s conception of man as a political animal to stress to which point the 
loss of the ability of an individual to materialize himself as a political subject through 
the articulation of political speech –as being able to affect others around us, as 
relevant to others– would entail sheer and literal dehumanization, the reduction of a 
human being to “the abstract nakedness of being human and nothing but human” 
(Arendt, 1985, p. 297), to becoming a talking human body in the best of cases. 
Belonging to a political community that attests to the rest of humanity our 
relevance for others –our political capacity– and thus the acknowledgment of this by 
everyone else becomes then the most basic hallmark of human dignity that a human 
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being can bear; for it is indeed our feature of being acknowledged –and thus, 
treated– as human by others that makes us human in the end. Being treated as 
human may not mean to be treated well, to have our civil rights respected, or any 
other pleasant or dignifying treatment. It simply means to be acknowledged as 
existing among people, as being susceptible of carrying out actions that would be 
meaningful, understandable, and relevant to those around us. In the very end, it 
means that potential receptors of our faculty of speech would consider us relevant 
sources of such; the very distinctive feature that separates humans from animals. The 
right to have rights becomes then the very first and foremost human right; one that 
makes us, constitute us as, human as much as demands protection of this fact by 
others through acknowledgement. All other rights –i.e. liberty, equality, and 
fraternity– can be predicated only and only if this first right, or condition, is upheld. 
No declaration of the Rights of Man could account for this right for as long as this 
sort of declarations are necessarily enmeshed within the nation-state, generally as 
founding documents. The flaw in the structure of the nation-state, as we have seen 
above, prevents any attempt on national sovereignty and necessarily drives the 
stateless into the paradox of lacking anyone to uphold their inalienable rights. This 
fact would lead Arendt to recall and agree with Edmund Burke’s critique of the 
Rights of Man as a mere “abstraction” that carry no political weight, as compared to 
those “inherited” “Rights of the Englishman” that had been wrestled by the people 
from political authority through a historical process that actually configures them 
politically as who they are. Burke, a contemporary of the great revolutions of the 18th 
century, considered that reinventing a list of sorts of all these rights was simply a 
mistake, and he worried that proclaiming them as universal would disguise their 
true origin as conquests taken from rulers (Moyn, 2012, p. 19). In this way, the rights 
of the people are effectively guaranteed through historically acquired political 
balance, something far more real than universal declarations with a presumed 
universally binding effect, that lacked this concrete legitimizing –and thus legally 
arguable–element. 
It could be argued, as Hauke Brunkhorst does (Brunkhorst, 1996), that the 
French republic declared after the Revolution (as well as most contemporary 
democracies) did not contain an ethnic element in its constitution, and was instituted 
over the rule of law, transforming human rights from moral claims into foundational 
elements of their positive law. This would mean that there is no reason to consider a 
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state of these characteristics could see a threat to its sovereignty in the upholding of 
its very constituent principles. However, I consider that this critique does not 
address the core of Arendt’s reasoning when she stresses that rights are granted to an 
individual through his membership –independently of whether this is based on 
ethnicity or not– of a people constituted into a nation-state. Her reasoning does not 
preclude this membership being acquired juridically or assumed as given through an 
ethnic dictum (which would anyway need to be carried out through some sort of 
juridical process). The paradox Arendt pointed out remains in (1) the fact that an 
individual is granted rights that are considered inalienable, since you cannot be 
granted what must already be a constituent part of who you are in its 
inalienability24; and (2) the fact that the individual must become part of a plural 
entity (the nation-state) in order to have rights as an individual. Both elements 
underscore the de-facto dependence of the individual of his membership in the state 
in order to have his rights guaranteed. 
 
A perplexity that remains 
 
Arendt (1985, p. 290) placed the concepts we have just discussed under a 
paragraph called The Perplexities of the Rights of Man. When she first published The 
Origins of Totalitarianism in 1951 (Arendt, 1985), the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights had been passed in December 1948 and global history 
did not offer much ground for hope in their practical implementation. Although she 
did not reconsidered her critique, Arendt could not foresee the preeminence that 
human rights would develop in the international order, as well as their future and 
powerful moral and political connotations in the minds of the human race. Almost 
every state on Earth has ratified many if not all of the 18 human rights treaties 
passed by the United Nations since 1948, and many other international agreements 
(i.e. different conventions and protocols on the treatment of refugees in 1951 and 
1967). International non-governmental human rights organizations carry a strong 
moral voice in denouncing abuses worldwide, and the moral force of human rights is 
rarely (though increasingly) questioned. In agreement with Michael Ignatieff, this 
																																																																		
24 The very etymology of the word inalienable bars this possibility; it means literally “something that 
cannot be made other”, from Latin “alius”, other or another. 
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can be summarized in a certain utopianism –if not Messianism– among 
contemporary human rights activists that consider human rights a moral language 
on a superior plane than politics (Ignatieff, 2000, p. 300). 
However, we can still perceive powerful reminders of the extent to which Arendt’s 
paradox of human rights remains to be solved. A very explicit but often overlooked 
one is the behaviour of the United States in this field. Having ratified only 5 of the 18 
international covenants of human rights (OCHR, 2018), American exceptionalism 
stands out in the sense that it appears to confer more value to the rights its citizens 
derive from their own Constitution than from the 1948 declaration (Ignatieff, 2000). 
And yet, we can spot the Arendtian paradox immediately when we realize that today: 
In most liberal democracies, citizens look first to their domestic rights and remedies, and only 
when these are exhausted or denied do they turn to human rights conventions and 
international bodies. National groups who do not have states of their own—Kurds, Kosovar 
Albanians, and Tamils—certainly make use of human rights language to denounce their 
oppression, but for ultimate remedy they seek statehood for themselves and the right to create 
a framework of political and legal protection for their people. (Ignatieff, 2000, p. 296) 
This is an unmistakable sign of implicit acknowledgement of the Arendtian 
paradox that, no matter how inalienable –and universal– human rights are, even in a 
time where they have become something close to a standard for measuring the 
fairness of any given claim, those who are supposed to be protected by them continue 
seeking statehood25. Interestingly enough, when ethnic conflict has reappeared, 
constitutionalism, overcoming the ethnic logic of the unitarian nation-state, has been 
seen as the solution (Ignatieff, 2000, p. 308). This simply betrays the fact that 
human rights, stuck as they are in a world of nation-states mindful of their sovereign 
rights and suspicious of any attempt to curtail it, are still regarded with a pragmatic 
eye not just by the states –knowing how relative and delayed are the consequences 
are for states who violate human rights– but more importantly by those who are 
supposed to benefit from them. Arendt’s paradox has been mitigated through 
international and political cooperation, but not given a satisfactory answer. This 
creates the risk of human rights becoming less important depending on the political 
priorities of the moment and eventually losing momentum and becoming stagnant in 
the face of economic crises and the growth of inequalities. This does not mean the 
denigration of the very positive track record of human rights for improving the 
																																																																		
25 Ignatieff (2000) will go on to point at the state of Israel as the paradigm of this attitude. 
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conditions of millions throughout the world since 1948. And neither does it imply 
that human rights need be derogated. However, it does suggest that the current 
fictional discourse of the innate nature of human rights should be questioned and 
replaced by a language liable to moral discussion centered around the common task 
of building a common core of agreed human needs to be satisfied. I am aware that 
human rights are exactly this, but it is again the problem of defining dignity in an 
actionable way that we encountered in the introduction that make them liable to 
political manipulation by any party involved in their protection or violation. In the 
end, the fact that Arendt’s paradox has not been addressed in full presents challenges 
in the argument for the universality of human rights, as the aftermath of the refugee 
crisis of 2015 in Europe has shown. 
* * * 
If Schmitt focuses on the sovereign and the distinction between friends and 
enemies within a political domain as a means for the polity to configure itself –an 
approach that sees any meddling to this vital processes as interference–, Arendt casts 
light on the implications of belonging to a state, on the role of citizenship. Although 
through a different path, she reaches a similar conclusion as Schmitt: the nature of 
the nation-state forbids any command coming from outside of itself that affects the 
distinction between citizen as a bearer of rights and non-citizen; between bearers of 
rights a non-bearers of rights within the polity. Arendt so a possible right to have 
rights as the only essential right reflecting an essential human need to be 
acknowledged by others in order to exists politically. 
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III. Not Merely a Matter of Rights 
 
Having examined some concepts casting a critique on the notion of the 
universality of human rights, I will now proceed to examine how the application of 
these concepts to concrete human rights issues may contribute to a better 
understanding of what is at stake during human rights crises. In this this chapter III, 
I will present some elements of the 2015 migrant crisis in order to show how these 
concepts may fare in practice.  
What has been known as the 2015 Migrant Crisis, was actually an exacerbation of 
an already ongoing humanitarian crisis where the war in Syria would push more and 
more people to seek asylum in Europe, having registered a steady increase of first-
time applications since the beginning of the conflict in 2011 (Eurostat, 2018). This 
would compound with people fleeing other long-standing conflicts such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq –indeed, most applicants came from these three countries. 
Following Eurostat, what made the summer of 2015 particularly harsh was the 
sudden increase of people arriving to Europe; if 2014 had seen at least 626,960 
people arriving in Europe with this intent, 2015 brought a minimum total of 
1,322,825 asylum seekers (Eurostat, 2018). This sudden massive influx of people by 
sea and land caught European authorities –of both destination and transit 
countries– unprepared to deal with their needs and applications. The benign 
Mediterranean summer would see the bulk of these people arriving mostly into 
Greek and Italian territory, and continuing in many cases by foot on the way to the 
countries whose asylum policies were deemed the most generous: Sweden and 
Germany. In particular, the more dangerous Central Mediterranean route gave way 
to an Eastern-Balkan route due to the latter involving a shorter –thus safer– sea path 
(ICMPD, 2018). I have relied on the account of the highlights prepared by the 
International Center for Migration and Policy Development (ICMPD, 2016), and on a 
well sourced timeline compiled in the Wikipedia26 (Wikipedia, 2018, May 09) for 
selecting a few events that took place during the crisis whose implications I will 
analyze below. I do not intend at all to be exhaustive, nor to provide a full account of 
																																																																		
26 Any reservations regarding the usage of this particular material should be put to rest should we 
look at it as a collection of references to mainstream media, such as the BBC, The Guardian, 
Deutsche Welle, and other widely respected media organizations. In any event, for every even I 
quote, I refer to the original source cited in the Wikipedia, and not to it. In this particular case, this 
happens to be the most complete timeline of the crisis available online. 
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the crisis. The cited works provide a very complete account as well as references for 
further understanding of the context. However, a final remark before our discussion 
is in order; the sheer human drama of the still ongoing crisis we will be discussing 
should not be underrated. More than 3,000 people perished at sea only in 2015, and 
hundreds of thousands faced uncertainty and rejection roaming through Europe with 
their families, while many are still unaccounted and remain vulnerable to organized 
crime (Rankin, 2016, May 19). It is indeed this dire situation of severe uprootedness 
and vulnerability that human rights aim to mitigate and prevent. 
 
The return of the sovereign 
 
One of the most striking images emerging when reading the accounts of the crisis 
was how frequently borders –manned by border guards and even riot police– were 
overpowered by masses of asylum seekers who were crossing national sovereign 
borders illegally. This is not necessarily forbidden by the Refugee Convention 
(Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951), that 
acknowledges the possibility that an asylum claimant might have to enter the country 
illegally before being able to request asylum (article 31). It happened in the 
Macedonian border between August 20-22nd, when the small Balkan country of 2 
million closed the border after having been taking in more than 3,000 people daily 
(BBC, 2015, August 22). Moreover, the country declared a state of emergency during 
those days. This resulted in clashes where Macedonian police had to resort to tear 
gas27. Hungary would follow in declaring a state of emergency in two counties later in 
September (BBC, 2015, September 15) after changing its law to bring criminal 
charges to anyone crossing the border illegally under penalty of prison or 
deportation. Such action directly contradicts the Refugee Convention on the issue of 
not returning anyone to the country of origin against their will. The following day, 
clashes at the same spot with asylum seekers left 20 police officers and an 
unaccounted number of asylum seekers wounded (BBC, 2015, September 16). Earlier 
that month, the Hungarian state found itself clashing with thousands of asylum 
seekers camping in front the Keleri railway station in Budapest demanding to be let 
through into Austria. After four days, with the acquiescence of Vienna, Hungary 
																																																																		
27 During 2016, more clashes would take place with the more than 11,000 refugees still then 
camped at neighbouring Idomeni (The Guardian, 2016, April 10). 
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provided transport to the border (BBC, 2o15, September, 05). Events of a similar 
nature took place in the Slovenian border with Croatia, forcing the former to call in 
its army in order to avoid seeing its border overrun again. These three countries also 
ended up erecting fences in their borders, Hungary covering 175 kilometres of its 
frontiers with Serbia and Croatia. 
The most obvious conclusion from these events is that a sovereign has discerned a 
situation where, following Schmitt’s discussion, the integrity of the polity is at risk. 
And, in order to thwart danger, the sovereign state resorts to the exception and the 
use of violence. The rights in opposition here are those of the sovereign to determine 
the exception at will –being that, as we have seen, its sovereign prerogative– and 
those of asylum seekers to seek asylum, and even to not be held responsible if they 
cross borders illegally in order to claim it. There is hardly a clearer sign of a 
distressed sovereign than governments declaring a state of exception and erecting 
fences on their borders.  
Should we frame these events only as a matter of human rights, we would end up 
with an incomplete picture of the situation. True enough, human rights are meant to 
protect the most vulnerable part, and that is most unlikely to be the state. However, 
considering the rationale of the sovereign –small countries seeing their borders 
overrun– Schmitt’s argument can be helpful in foreseeing situations in which a state 
might decide to stop honoring its human rights commitments. In the European case, 
states did foresee the inability of small border countries (Macedonia, Croatia, 
Slovenia) to cope with masses of asylum seekers, but acted too slowly due their 
sovereign integrity not being foreseeably at risk. It would only be when border states 
would allow asylum seekers to go through that the central European states would 
react. In any case, the underlying moral question in this situation remains: to what 
extent should a sovereign sacrifice its interests for the good of others alien to its 
polity, which takes us to Arendt’s paradox further below. 
 
A political that never went away 
 
A more salient feature of the 2015 crisis is the role of the distinction of the friend-
enemy that conforms to the Schmittian domain of the political. This is well 
exemplified not only in the different obstacles thrown at the path of asylum seekers –
wherever a border is set, those outside them are the others by force–, but by the 
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political consequences it had. The strengthening of European populism that took 
place right after the dramatic events of 2015 (The Economist, 2015, December 10) is 
grounded on these parties using an explicit Schmittian distinction, one that is 
perhaps too literal. However, the core of Schmitt’s notion of enemy lies in the 
incompatibility of interests with the enemy and their potential to escalate into open 
conflict, and not necessarily on ill intent.  
Through multiple instances of chaos that peppered the asylum seekers’ march to 
the heart of Europe, populist and racist parties received ample audiovisual material 
to build a demonized picture of the asylum seeker28, one that, judging from their 
portrayed behaviour had completely incompatible interests with the common 
European citizen. If their biased representation of reality proved effective in stoking 
enmity towards the refugee, it was because they were alone in doing this. 
Mainstream European parties were too busy scrambling to find a solution according 
to international human rights law. The urgency of finding means to sustain hundreds 
of thousands of people out in the open compounded with pressure from the public, 
who were influenced by human rights organizations campaigning for the rights of 
refugees to asylum. And it is precisely here that the domain of the political is 
becoming tainted by other domains, in this case by the moral domain. The 
considerations over the inalienable right to a minimum standard of dignity for 
asylum seekers and the moral imperative to satisfy it  overshadowed the discussion 
over what were the interests of this group in contraposition to those of the individual 
nation-states. The unpalatable though fair questions of whether EU states could or 
even were required to sustain the needs of asylum seekers who are choosing certain 
countries over others to formulate their request, of how many could a state 
reasonably sustain, and what amount of resources were fair to allocate to this task 
were left for later29. Populist parties presented themselves as the only parties posing 
the tough questions that, formally, considered the interests of the polity in the face of 
the interests of the alien, a clear friend-enemy distinction. 
It might be objected that this is an easy critique to make in hindsight. However, 
had the distinction of the friend-enemy which defines the domain of the political 
																																																																		
28 One that was built on an explicit and politicized notion of religion confronting Islam and 
Christendom. 
29 And were nevertheless tackled through a much criticized agreement with Turkey, as well a 
hardening of national asylum laws to extremes sometimes in contradiction with the Refugee 
Convention, as, i.e. the Hungarian laws. 
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been kept clearly in mind by mainstream parties and by governments, and had this 
domain not been tainted by moral considerations beforehand, this truly political 
question on the interests of asylum seekers and the states might have appeared as a 
clear, even obvious, matter. Answering this question needed not be a way of cutting 
down a state’s commitment to human rights and taking care of the asylum seekers, 
but a tool for clarity and foresight, as, i.e. to assess the resources and existing legal 
frameworks already in place in order to cope with the humanitarian crisis. The value 
of assessing the possibility that we find ourselves in front a situation that can be 
defined in political terms, lies in the clarity it brings when setting priorities: the 
interest of an enemy is incompatible with ours, but compromise need not be 
impossible (particularly when the stage of war is not in sight). However, in order for 
this to be possible, the peremptory morality inherent within the notion of human 
dignity, has to be kept separate from the political analysis. Moreover, tying the 
definition of the national interest to a moral notion such as human rights, although 
reassuring, might prove to be self-deluding because the survival of a polity might 
involve violating human rights in a time of crisis. Moreover, moral notions are a 
clouding element in assessing the friend-enemy distinction. This does not mean 
human rights lose preeminence, but that the fundamental interest of the polity must 
not be excluded from our calculations30. 
 
Who enforces the right to have rights? 
 
One striking occurrence during the crisis was the behaviour of the Czech 
government, who demanded from those being detained in its territory to cover for 
the expenses they were generating in the state with any valuable they carried, to the 
sum of $10 per day. Detentions could be up to 90 days (Calamur, 2015, October 22). 
This is clearly an unreasonable –and cruel– demand to impose on someone walking 
thousands of kilometres to request asylum. And it indeed contravenes the 
Convention on Refugees. However, this demand is still present in the Czech Asylum 
																																																																		
30 One further example of the confusion brought about by not keeping a conceptually pure domain 
of the political the analysis of a situation could be the claim, by no other than the NATO Supreme 
Commander in Europe, that Russia had weaponized the refugee crisis (Deutsche Welle, March 2). 
Again, formulating this analysis need not imply denying fundamental rights to asylum seekers, but, 
foresight, planning, and a proportionate response. The political, the dimension where the distinction 
friend-enemy operates, is a stubborn reality that may choose to ignore at our own peril. 
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Act (Act on Asylum, 1999), section 78d-1, and the press has not informed of any 
international consequence of effect beyond a condemnation by the UN and criticism 
from human rights organizations, all of them useless for those asylum seekers who 
were strip-searched for valuables to pay for the cost of their –forced– detention. 
Indeed this provision appeared to inspire a similar one the Danish government in 
January 2016 (Dearden, 2016, January 26), topped with an added call to end the 
1951 refugee convention (Kingsley, 2016, January 12). 
What these examples reflect is Arendt’s paradox of human rights in concrete 
action. A smirking Czech official could ask an asylum seeker while strip-searching 
him “where are your human rights now?”. For those asylum seekers who found 
themselves under the authority of the Czech government would be completely 
helpless to even utter a credible claim. Deprived of any sort of diplomatic protection 
–and thus an enforceable legal status– by their condition of escapees, and sunk to 
the lowest of statuses possible –that which Arendt would call “bare humanity” 
(Arendt, 1985, p. 297), they found themselves in the midst of the paradox of being in 
possession of universal, inherent, and inalienable human rights about which those 
with power over them, and in charge of enforcing them, could care less. This 
situation was clearly caused by what we could call institutional disaffection. The 
Czech government, as a member of the European Union, is committed to human 
rights. And yet, as all other members of the European Union, it is uninterested in 
dealing with the refugee crisis and craves to get rid of all asylum seekers altogether. 
European governments spent a good part of 2015 scheming ways of deflecting the 
flow of refugees, sharing the burden of their upkeep, and even be able to relocate 
them to Turkey in complex legal arrangements to reform the effects of the 
counterproductive Dublin Regulation31. 
It might appear that merely stating the lingering presence of Arendt’s paradox 
might not bring much clarity to the issue. But just as the concept of the political can 
prove itself valuable when it comes to better understanding a situation, Arendt’s 
paradox of human rights can compel us to look for more guarantees when it comes to 
combatting institutional disaffection. At least within a European framework, one of 
these, i.e., could consist in assigning responsibility for every asylum claimant to more 
																																																																		
31 The current European framework for determining which state is to be responsible for a refugee 
claim. It places a disproportionate burden on those countries along the European external border, 
since the rules mandate it is the first state to which an asylum claimant arrives who will have to 
process the request. 
 40	
than one state; the recipient state would carry itself as always. But then, in order to 
break the paradox, a guardian state would step in sending personnel to follow 
closely the case of every asylum seeker whose care has been assigned. As a result of 
this, an orphaned asylum seeker in terms of state, becomes adopted for the purposes 
of protection by another state devoting concrete material resources to carrying out 
this task. It would never be the same as that same state taking care of its own 
citizens, but it could be implemented with more guarantees, resulting in more 
protecting from abuse for the asylum seeker. What is important about his idea is that 
hails from having present the reality of Arendt’s paradox as the driving force of our 
thinking about human rights. I believe this proves a more fertile ground when it 
comes to deal with cold unsavory facts than the recourse to an intangible human 
dignity. 
In essence, all three elements discussed –the role of the sovereign, the distinction 
friend-enemy, and Arendt’s paradox of human rights– can bring tangible benefits to 
some of the contradictions which particular nation-states when faced with asylum 
seekers echoing the proclaimed universality of human rights and claiming their right 
to asylum as proclaimed in article 14 of the UNDHR: “Everyone has the right to seek 
and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” 
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I have drawn from the work of Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt in 
order to underscore two different sets of problems derived from the notion of the 
universality of human rights. Both critiques share a concern about the effects the 
language of the universality of human rights can have when it comes to assessing a 
situation where these rights are in crisis. I have used examples from the 2015 
European migrant crisis to show how these concepts would fare in practice. 
In particular, I have used the Schmittian notions of the political and the sovereign 
to underscore how the universality of human rights has counterproductive effects on 
the ability of states to determine those groups that might pursue opposing interests 
to theirs –enemies in a Schmittian sense–, and cloud the understanding of a state as 
to determining what measures it should adopt in order to have its interests prevail. 
The ability of a state to enact those measures can also be affected due to the 
constraints on the sovereign the universality of human rights imposes by definition. 
I have shown how the paradox of human rights that Arendt formulated in 1951 
and grounded in the innate logic of the nation-state can still be detected in the 
behaviour of nation-states in the midst of a crisis. More importantly, I have 
suggested a possible solution to the problems raised by this contradiction in the 
nature of human rights. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to present theoretical concepts –the sovereign, 
the political, the paradox of human rights, and the right to have rights– and frame 
them in a way that can be used to address the contradictions that are raised by the 
universality of human rights. I believe these concepts provide an unusual clarity to 
any situation where human rights are violated that involves a state actor. The 
amount of practical examples I have provided is clearly insufficient, and a deeper 
look at the practice of international human rights law will likely show that something 
very similar –and yet insufficient in a fundamental sense– to the concerns I have 
raised is actually taken into account to a certain degree in the practice of human 
rights law. However, I would contend that the value of these concepts lies in the way 
they question what I consider an hegemonic narrative of the universality of human 
rights. I find it counterproductive for it deprives the public of the tools to think 
independently about human rights without the dogmatic crutches of the universality 
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of human dignity. I believe this leads to misconceptions on the possibilities and 
limits of human rights –exemplified in the issue of the inflation of human rights32 I 
have chose not to address in the body of this thesis–, and to their eventual discredit. I 
consider the contemporary wave of populism a worrisome example of the later, one 
that, as I have contended, can be understood in Schmittian terms. A further harmful 
consequence of these misconceptions is the pressure the public may then exert on 
states derived from unreasonable expectations as to what states should do in regards 
to human rights.  
This thesis can barely scratch the surface of the “unfinished business” Glendon 
(1999) described when referring to the task of setting the foundations of 
contemporary human rights. However, I believe it does point to a possible avenue of 
criticism that could render a positive improvement in the defense of the common 
spirit all declarations of human rights share. 
 
																																																																		
32 The trend observed by some authors of the constant growth in the number of rights that are 
considered a human prerogative, sometimes to the point of absurd as exemplified by Milan 
Kundnera’s Brigitte claiming her right to parking in Paris was a human right, cited by Clapham (2015). 
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Abstract 
Two Problems Surrounding the Universality of Human Rights 
 
This thesis points at two main issues in the concept of the universality of 
human rights. First, the obstacles it poses to the notions of the sovereign and 
the political as defined by Carl Schmitt. Second, the paradox of human rights 
formulated by Hannah Arendt remains unsolved, since the contradiction at its 
heart has not changed since its formulation. The third chapter attempts to 
illustrate how these theoretical concepts are relevant for our understanding of 
human rights crises involving state actors analyzing some of the events that 
took place during the 2015 migrant crisis in Europe. The thesis concludes 
pointing at the need to end the misconceptions derived from the idea of the 
universality of human rights in the mind of the public. 
 
 
Title in Estonian: Kaks probleemi inimõiguste universaalsusega 
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Appendix 1: Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
Preamble 
 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world, 
 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in 
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the 
advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and 
belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest 
aspiration of the common people, 
 
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a 
last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights 
should be protected by the rule of law, 
 
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations 
between nations, 
 
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed 
their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have 
determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom, 
 
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in 
cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
 
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the 
greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge, 
 
Now, therefore, 
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The General Assembly, 
 
Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every 
individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in 
mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these 
rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, 
to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among 
the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories 
under their jurisdiction. 
 
Article I 
 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a 
spirit of brotherhood. 
 
Article 2 
 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. 
 
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, 
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a 
person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under 
any other limitation of sovereignty. 
 
Article 3 
 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. 
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Article 4 
 
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade 
shall be prohibited in all their forms. 
 
Article 5 
 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Article 6 
 
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the 
law. 
 
Article 7 
 
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any 
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to 
such discrimination. 
 
Article 8 
 
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the 
constitution or by law. 
 
Article 9 
 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. 
 
Article 10 
 
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and 
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obligations and of any criminal charge against him. 
 
Article 11 
 
1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has 
had all the guarantees necessary for his defence. 
 
2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier 
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal 
offence was committed. 
 
Article 12 
 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks. 
 
Article 13 
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the 
borders of each State. 
 
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to 
return to his country. 
 
Article 14 
 
1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution. 
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2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely 
arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations. 
 
Article 15 
 
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the 
right to change his nationality. 
 
Article 16  
 
1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are 
entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. 
 
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the 
intending spouses. 
 
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection by society and the State. 
 
Article 17 
 
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association 
with others. 
 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
 
Article 18 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
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alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
 
Article 19 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers. 
 
Article 20 
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 
 
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association. 
 
Article 21  
 
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives. 
 
2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country. 
 
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; 
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent 
free voting procedures. 
 
Article 22 
 
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is 
entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation 
and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the 
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free 
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development of his personality. 
 
Article 23 
 
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. 
 
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for 
equal work. 
 
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration 
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and 
supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. 
 
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests. 
 
Article 24 
 
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation 
of working hours and periodic holidays with pay. Article 25 
 
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the 
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack 
of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. 
 
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All 
children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social 
protection. 
 
Article 26 
 
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in 
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the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be 
compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally 
available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of 
merit. 
 
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human 
personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and 
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the 
activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 
 
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be 
given to their children. 
 
Article 27 
 
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which 
he is the author. 
 
Article 28 
 
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized. 
 
Article 29 
 
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible. 
 
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only 
to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing 
due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of 
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meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society. 
 
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
 
Article 30 
 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed 
at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein. 
 58	
Appendix 2: Declaration of the Rights of Man - 1789 
Approved by the National Assembly of France, August 26, 1789 
 
The representatives of the French people, organized as a National 
Assembly, believing that the ignorance, neglect, or contempt of the rights of 
man are the sole cause of public calamities and of the corruption of 
governments, have determined to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, 
unalienable, and sacred rights of man, in order that this declaration, being 
constantly before all the members of the Social body, shall remind them 
continually of their rights and duties; in order that the acts of the legislative 
power, as well as those of the executive power, may be compared at any 
moment with the objects and purposes of all political institutions and may 
thus be more respected, and, lastly, in order that the grievances of the citizens, 
based hereafter upon simple and incontestable principles, shall tend to the 
maintenance of the constitution and redound to the happiness of all. Therefore 
the National Assembly recognizes and proclaims, in the presence and under 
the auspices of the Supreme Being, the following rights of man and of the 
citizen: 
 
Articles: 
 
1. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions 
may be founded only upon the general good. 
 
2. The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and 
imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and 
resistance to oppression. 
 
3. The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body 
nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly 
from the nation. 
 
4. Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one 
else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except 
those which assure to the other members of the society the enjoyment of the 
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same rights. These limits can only be determined by law. 
 
5. Law can only prohibit such actions as are hurtful to society. Nothing may 
be prevented which is not forbidden by law, and no one may be forced to do 
anything not provided for by law. 
 
6. Law is the expression of the general will. Every citizen has a right to 
participate personally, or through his representative, in its foundation. It must 
be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. All citizens, being equal in 
the eyes of the law, are equally eligible to all dignities and to all public 
positions and occupations, according to their abilities, and without distinction 
except that of their virtues and talents. 
 
7. No person shall be accused, arrested, or imprisoned except in the cases 
and according to the forms prescribed by law. Any one soliciting, transmitting, 
executing, or causing to be executed, any arbitrary order, shall be punished. 
But any citizen summoned or arrested in virtue of the law shall submit without 
delay, as resistance constitutes an offense. 
 
8. The law shall provide for such punishments only as are strictly and 
obviously necessary, and no one shall suffer punishment except it be legally 
inflicted in virtue of a law passed and promulgated before the commission of 
the offense. 
 
9. As all persons are held innocent until they shall have been declared 
guilty, if arrest shall be deemed indispensable, all harshness not essential to 
the securing of the prisoner's person shall be severely repressed by law. 
 
10. No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his 
religious views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order 
established by law. 
 
11. The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most 
precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and 
print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as 
shall be defined by law. 
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12. The security of the rights of man and of the citizen requires public 
military forces. These forces are, therefore, established for the good of all and 
not for the personal advantage of those to whom they shall be intrusted. 
 
13. A common contribution is essential for the maintenance of the public 
forces and for the cost of administration. This should be equitably distributed 
among all the citizens in proportion to their means. 
 
14. All the citizens have a right to decide, either personally or by their 
representatives, as to the necessity of the public contribution; to grant this 
freely; to know to what uses it is put; and to fix the proportion, the mode of 
assessment and of collection and the duration of the taxes. 
 
15. Society has the right to require of every public agent an account of his 
administration. 
 
16. A society in which the observance of the law is not assured, nor the 
separation of powers defined, has no constitution at all. 
 
17. Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be 
deprived thereof except where public necessity, legally determined, shall 
clearly demand it, and then only on condition that the owner shall have been 
previously and equitably indemnified. 
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